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Summary  findiings
The transition  from socialism  characteri.tically  reducts  * Be simple,  not complex  or oversophisticated.
existing  tax revenues  at the same  time  that it increases  *  Be administratively  implementable  with current
the need for government  spending.  An increasing  need  resources.
for revenue  combined  with an eroding  tax base  creates  a  *  Impose  a low tax burden  on all economic  agents.
transition-related  fiscal  gap and a challenge  for tax  *  Rely  on broad tax bases  with minimum  exemptions.
policy.  *  Begin  the long-term  improvement  of tax
The solution,  say Bogetil5and  Hillman,  is not to lay a  administration.
heavier  tax burden on new private  firms.  The issue is  *  Limit  the severity  of tax penalties  in the transition
how to meet revenue  needs  without inhibiting  private  from an authoritarian to a democratic  regime.
sector development.  Large-scale  tax evasion  in the  In theory, reduciaig  the cost of compliance  and
private  sector  - the de facto outcome  in Bulgaria  and in  increasing  the expected  cost of noncompliance  should
many other transitional  economies  - may  be a good  reduce tax evasion  and increase  tax revenues.  In practice,
incentive  for development  of private  enterprise,  but it is  small  businesses  and self-employed  citizens  tend to evade
illegal  and inequitable  to wage-earners  and salaried  taxes, providing  an effective  zero tax base. The
workers . government  has little  to lose from reducing  taxes on the
The chief means  of increasing  tax revenue  are to (1)  self-employed  but, to be equitable,  it should reduce  taxes
reduce tax rates  to decrease  the benefit  of evasion,  (2)  for everyone. As a general rule, say Bogetic  and
improve  tax administration  (to increase  tax coverage  and  Hillman,  economies  in transition  should impose  lower
better detect evasion),  and (3) increase  penalties  for  tax burdens  than are imposed  in mature  western  market
evasion.  These  three measures  effectively  decrease  the  economies.  Low  tax rates may  counter the traditional
benefits  and increase  the cost of tax evasion  to economic  lack of trust in government  by citizens  in formerly
agents.  socialist  economies.  It may also reduce the perception  of
It takes  time to improve  tax administration,  however.  "exploitation"  by giving  the impression  of a more
Given  administrative  limitations,  what should the tax  modest  government  consistent  with the dynamic  private
structure be? Bogeti'  and Hillmnan  contend thit  an  sector led economy.
administratively feasibile  system designed to e:cCourage
development  of the private  sector during  the transition
should:
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'arthasarathi  Shome, and Janet Stotsky.Tax issues have a certain commonality in all countries as
governments seek to match budgetary demands against revenue
availability.  Specific tax-related issues arise in developing
economies, where neither markets nor traditions of tax compliance
are well developed (see  Newbery and Stern, 1987; Bird, 1992; and
Burgess and Stern, 1993).  Economies in transition, and
developing countries generally, are also characterized by absence
of a  tradition of voluntary tax compliance.  There are also other
identifiably distinct transition-related aspects of taxation (see
Tanzi, 1993a).  In particular, the transition from socialism to a
market economy has characteristically given rise to a fiscal gap
as expenditure obligations increase and traditional tax bases
inherited from socialism erode.  Potential new tax bases are in
the expanding private sector, but the tax administration in the
early stages of transition  is not yet equipped to monitor the
market transactions of the many new private businesses, and in
the absence of tradition of voluntary self-assessment individuals
are not forthcoming in complying with tax obligations.
Improvement in tax administration enhances tax monitoring
capabilities, but leads to a policy dilemma, in that success  in
encompassing the private sector in the tax base discourages
private initiative, when the private sector provides the primary
impetus for development of a market economy.
In this paper, we demonstrate these circumstances against
the background of the experience of Bulgaria, and consider the
form that the tax system might take to accommodate the conditions
of the transition.  Section 1 describes the characteristic2
budgetary expenditvre pressures associated with transition.
These pressures are then subsequently taken as given, and
following sections describe (i)  the general background on
Bulgaria's experience with transition,  (ii)  the tax bases
inherited from socialism, (iii) the revenue performance of these
tax bases in the early transition, and (iv) the tax system
introduced in Bulgaria to replace the prior socialist tax
structure.  We then propose reasons why economies in transition
(and Bulgaria in particular) might contemplate choosing other
than to model tax structures after those of more mature western
market economies, and why the design of a tax system for the
transition should take account of Laffer-curve effects that
encompass tax-evasion as well as supply-side incentives.  The
final section demonstrates the need for accuracy in projections
of tax revenue in the transition, by comparing revenue realized
from different tax bases with revenue projections forming the
basis for policy conditionality for international agency
financing.  We show how, if the distinct problems associated with
tax bases in the transition are not recognized, the ensuing
overly optimistic revenue projections inevitably lead to non-
compliance with required limits of budgetary deficits.  Thus, we
present the case for a modest tax structure in the transition,
and also for modesty in making revenue projections for revenues
from tax bases in the transition.:3
1. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN THE TRANSITION
In the initiation of the transition from planning to a
market economy, the government withdraws from pervasive planning
and regulation of economic activity, and the state enterprise, an
extended hand of government under socialism, withdraws from its
role as social protector of workers and their families.  The
socialist factory had attended to the housing needs of its
workers, day care, education, health clinics, culture, and
assurance of employment.I The transition brings to an end the
factory's social role, because of a change to a market conception
of the role of a factory, and also because of financial duress of
state enterprises, 2 which cannot be counted upon to be capable of
continuing to provide the social services of the past, even where
out of habit, principle, or worker pressure, management seeks to
maintain the past paternalism towards workers.
The government therefore confronts the obligation to replace
the factory as provider of social services, including attending
to the social consequences of unemployment that under socialism
would have remained contained within the factory.  The social
safety net that the government is obliged to provide can be
required to be encompassing of broad segments of the population,
I/  For elaboration on the transformation of the role of the
factory in the transition, see Hillman (1994).
2/  In the short run, enterprises have assets that can be run
down to cushion adverse demand and input shocks.  See, for
example, the behavior reported by Gelb et al. (1992)  on the
response of Polish firms to the "big-baaig"  reform program
initiated in January 1990.4
who fall into poverty not necessarily because of unemployment
(which is often maintained at low levels), but as the consequence
of erosion of real values of fixed incomes and transfer payments.
Maintenance of infrastructure, energy subsidies for private
consumption, and the like, can add to expenditures, as can
political pressures for state-enterprise subsidization.  With
internal borrowing possibilities limited by the absence of
developed domestic capital markets and by lack of trust in the
government, and foreign borrowing constrained by past debt, only
increased tax revenues stand in the way of inflationary
financing.'
2. SOME BACKGROUND  ON BULGARIA
In contrast to Hungary and Poland, where there had been
gradual introduction of market forces and enterprise
decentralization throughout the 1980s, Bulgaria began the
transition from socialism in 1989 from a high level of planning
and negligible private production.  When state orders ceased,
Bulgarian enterprise managers had no experience with a market
economy.  Bulgaria had also made less prior adjustment in its
international trade to western markets, and Bulgarian enterprises
were consequently very adversely affected by the end of the CMEA
trading system.  Following the 1990 moratorium on external debt
repayments, Bulgaria lost access to commercial external
3/  This opens up macroeconomic issues associated with budgetary
deficits that are not our direct concern in this paper.  On these
issues, see Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991).4~~~~~~~
financing.'  There  was a significant  acceleration  of reforms  in
1991, when a liberalization and stabilization program was
launched amidst a harsh environment of output decline.
Privatization howevei moved slowly.5  On the other hand, private
sector development was significant.  The private sector
contributed less than 5% of GDP at the end of 1989, and 36.8% in
mid-1993; and whereas there were registered 24,500 private
enterprises  at the  end  of 1989,  there  were  315,000  enterprises
registered in mid-1993.'
The expansion of the private sector took place against the
background of the characteristic declines in GDP associated with
the transition.  The state enterprise sector was making
significant  losses:  in 1992 these  losses  were  in the  neighborhood
of 7% of GDP (which equalled the government's budget deficit for
that year), and for the first three quarters of 1993 preliminary
estimates indicated combined losses of the state-enterprise
sector of approximately 15% of GDP. 7 The private sector was in
41  Outstanding debt has not been necessary for difficulties in
access to external finance.  Romania, which had no substantial
debt before it embarked on the transition, also faced a  severe
external financing constraint, due to perceived low
creditworthiness, even in the absence of large pre-existing debt.
S/  Only two large state enterprises had been privatized by the
end of'  1993, and a small number of joint ventures had been
author'.zed  by the Ministry of Industry.
O/  Source: Small and medium enterprises division, Ministry of
Industry, Government of Bulgaria.
7/  Source: World Bank staff astimates.6
contrast overall profitable.$  Whereas the state-enterprise
sector was concentrated in industrial production, the private
sector was more specialized to trade and services; and whereas
the state enterprises were characteristically large, the private
enterprises were in general small, with average employment of 2.2
employees at the end of 1993.9
These circumstances have implications for the tax base in
transition, to which we shall return.  First, however, we
consider the tax bases inherited from the prior socialist system.
3. SOCIALIST TAXATTON
As was the case in socialist countries generally, the
principal tax base in Bulgaria under the socialist regime
consisted of state enterprise surpluses subject to turnover and
profits taxes.  In 1988, the last complete year of planned
socialism, these two taxes together with excises provided
approximately 60% of total government revenue, equal to some 34%
of  GDP  (see  Table 1).  Numerous different rates of turnover tax
reflected pricing decisions based on conceptions of social need,
while the profits tax distributed surpluses from enterprises
whose prices yielded a "profit" to enterprises whose prices
resulted in "losses."  These profits and losses  did not have the
S'  In 1992 aggregate profits of the private sector, for firms
encompassed by the survey of the National Statistical Instltute
of Bulgaria and reporting, were 3.4 billion leva on revenue of 67
billion leva.
9'  Source: National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria7
same connotations as in a market economy; on the contrary, an
enterprise making losses was perceived to be rendering socially
valuable services at affordable prices.  Consistently, there was
no bankruptcy.
Social security payments were also a  significant source of
revenue, 9.5% of GDP in 1988.  Small amounts of revenue, around
1% of GDP, were raised from excise taxes and import duties on
goods traded outside of the CMEA system of international trade.
Non-tax revenue was 10 percent of GDP, of which 4 percent derived
from the taxes and subsidies of the CMEA price equalization
mechanism. 10
The personal income tax contributed revenues of 4 percent of
GDP in 1988.  The purpose in principle of the personal income tax
in the planned socialist economy was to equate aggregate earned
income  with aggregate expenditures, rather than to raise revenue
per se.11 Since the state had direct claim to enterprise
surpluses via the profits tax, there was no need to tax the wages
of workers.  Any income tax could be equivalently collected from
lot  The budgetary contribution from the CMEA-related price
equalization fund varied considerably.  For example, the fund
contributed 10.5 percent of government revenue in 1987 but only
5.4 percent in 1986.  CMEA-trade related taxes and subsidies
could in principle be a net source of revenue or expenditure for
the government.  For a detailed analysis of the budgetary impact
of the cessation of these taxes and subsidies in the Hungarian
case, see Abel et al. (1992).
II/  Since the state was responsible for investment and since it
guaranteed universal retirement benefits (i.e, pensions, health
benefits), there was little incentive for personal saving.
Personal asset accumulation via personal savings was inconsistent
with the objectives of the socialist system.  Individuals could
however have personal savings accoun  ;s.Table 1:  Consolidated  GasW Govunment  Revmnues,  19U/1"3
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enterprises  by directly  paying  workers  a net-of-tax  wage,  with
the implicit income tax being transferred to the enterprise
surpluses, or alternatively, the subsidy to the enterprise could
be reduced.  12
4.  CHANGES IN THE TAX BASE IN THE TRANSITION
Table 1  also demonstrates the changing pattern of reNsnues
in the early years of transition.  These changes reflect the
influences of (i) the decline in state enterprise output and
12/  The tax instruments under socialism were not used for the
typical fiscal policy purposes as in a market economy: see Mario
I. Blejer and Gyorgy Szapary (1991).9
profitability noted above, (ii) the breakdown of financial
discipline and enforcement of contracts at all levels, (iii) the
incompatibility of  tax administration capacity with market
transactions and the chaniging  nature and scope of the
administrative task,  (iv)  tax evasion reflectiny self interest
and a  distrust of government carrying over from tl,o  previous
regime, (v)  effects of inflation on revenues, in particular the
decline in real value of revenues as  a result of inflation due to
collection lags (the  Tanzi effect), and also the complex
interactions of inflation and specific provisions of the tax
system  (inventory  accounting, depreciation method, and interest
payment deductibility), (vi) revenue loss due to reductions in
tax rates from high values under socialism, the lower tax rates
coinciding with reduced levels of economic activity in the
traditional taxed sectors, and (vii) the end of CMEA trade-
related revenues.
While these effects catalogued above were present in
Bulgaria to different degrees, most significant was ths erosion
of the tax base provided ky the state (and municipal) enterprise
sector.  The state enterprises, which had been previously
sheltered from the market by guaranteed state orders,1 3 were
obliged to negotiate contracts in a  market environment, and to
locate new buyers for their output.  The enterprises were also
13/  In case of exports, state orders were guaranteed via the
CMEA system.10
obliged to secure their own inputs.  1
4 The change to market
transactions affected tax revenues.  The direct supervision and
control that had accompanied state orders was no longer present,
and since managers were not direct claimants to enterprise
profits, incentives were present to shift profits to private
firms."1  Failure  to comply  with  tax  obligations  was  also  part
of a general phenomenon of arrears or non-payments in the state-
enterprise sector; arrears took a variety of forms, including tax
arrears from non-financial state enterprises, banks, private
individuals and enterprises, wage arrears to state enterprise
employees, and interenterprise arrears, both within the state
sector and between private and state sectors.  The government's
share of arrears was reflected in unpaid taxes.  The interlocking
arrears tied enterprises to one another, and in the absence of
financial discipline, the threat of penalties for non-payment,
including in particular taxes due, lacked credibility.
The tax administration was also required to adapt to market
transactions.  Whereas the large state enterprises in decline
were part of the official tax system wherein they traditionally
14/  Thinking was also often geared away from association between
financial gain and production, as evidenced by large, often
country-wide Ponzi schemes in post-socialist economies.  In
Poland, Yugoslavia (Serbia  and Montenegro), and Romania, for
example, "bankers" were paying interest sometimes as high as 800
percent per quarter to their "depositors" as long as the supply
of new deposits exceeded the deLt service.  In the end, the
schemes broke down.  The wide participation in these schemes
despite their evident nonsustainability was indicative of the
magnitude and the spread of a speculative mind-set in the
transition  (Washington  Post,  October  17,  1993).
IS/  See Hillman and Peters (1993).11
paid profits and turnover taxes, private sector expansion created
potentially taxable entitiep that previously had no tax files.
To include the new private sector in the tax base, the tax
administration was obliged to identify, locate, monitor, and
enforce collection of tax obligations.  This was facilitated in
part by the requirement that enterprises register with the tax
authorities in the course of registration with the Chambers of
Commerce (such registration permitting foreign exchange
transactions to be conducted via the commercial banking system).
Monitoring the vast number of new potential taxpayers was however
a formidable task for the tax administration.  The administration
had been designed for direct auditing of a smaller number of
state enterprises.  Under the socialist system, tax monitoring
could be conducted in the course of all-encompassing mandatory
field audits and inspactions.  Since enterprise outputs were
predetermined by planning, auditors knew what should have been
produced and shipped, at what prices --  and to whom.' 6 The
calculation and monitoring of tax obligations was therefore
relatively simple.  With the onset of a market economy, too many
individual agents incur tax obligations for the previous direct
auditing system to continue to be effective.  Administrative
specialization is necessary in assessing and collecting taxes.
Self-assessment and random audits replace detailed direct tax
liability calculations.
16/  That is, measurement of output preceded market sales: see
Hillman (1991).12
Tax compliance in the new private sector is also influenced
by cultural and historical influences. 17 Under socialism, there
was a widespread individual distrust of government.  The distrust
carries over into the transition, making individuals reluctant
(or  more reluctant than usual) to cooperate with tax authorities
in the manner required in a  market-based tax system in providing
information via voluntary self assessment of tax obligations.
The outcome of these different effects is reflected in Table
1 in the changes in revenue collections from different taxes.
Revenues from the profits tax declined from over 21% of GDP in
1988 and over 23% in 1989, to 8% of GDP in 1992, and revenue from
the turnover tax declined from around 11% in 1988 and 1989 to
under 6% in 1992.  The decline in revenues from these two taxes
was the principal cause of a decline in the total revenue-to-GDP
ratio from 57 percent in 1988 to 37 percent in 1992.
Social security contributions increased somewhat relative  o
GDP, and non-tax revenue fell (in particular due to the end of
the CMEA-related taxes and subsidies).  Revenue from the personal
income tax on wages and salaries however increased, from 4.0
percent of GDP in 1988 to 5.9 percent in 1992.
An Olivera-Tanzi effect reduced real tax revenues in 1991,
when inflation was over 300%.  In contrast, there was an inverse
Olivera-Tanzi effect in 1992 and 1993, as inflation decreased to
90% and 70%, respectively.  In the absence of data on collection
lags it is not possible to assess directly the relative strengths
17/  See Casson  (1993).13
of these effects.  What is evident, however, is that despite the
increase in real value of tax revenue due to the fall in
inflation in 1992 and 1993, the more fundamental transition-
related influences described above continued in these years to
erode the traditional tax bases.
5.  BULGARIA'S CHANGING TAX SYSTEM IN  THE TRANSITION
How did Bulgaria respond in the transition in changing the
tax system that had been inherited from socialism?  We proceed
now to describe briefly how the tax system evolved in the
transition."  The focus is on the three key taxes: profits tax,
turnover tax (and its replacement, VAT), and the personal income
tax.  9
A.  The Profits Tax
As of mid-1993, state enterprises were taxed at the rate of
52 percent (consisting  of a 40 percent standard tax rate accruing
to the central government, 10 percent to the municipality in
which the enterprise was located, and a  2 percent irrigation
tax), and enterprises owned by a local municipality were taxed at
the rate of 42 percent (the 40 percent standard rate to the
It/  For a detailed description and evaluation, see The World
Bank (1993).
iw  Other taxes --  excises, property taxes, user charges,
capital gains, and import duties --  have do not have the
potential (and in the case of trade taxes are not desirable
means, see George Fane, 1993) to resolve the transitional fiscal
gap.  Other tax possibilities include presumptive taxation (Tanzi
and Casanegra de Jantscher, 1987).14
municipality and the 2 percent irrigation tax).0  The tax rate
on profits of private enterprises depended in a complex way on
the extent of private and/or foreign ownership and the value of
profits. 2 1  However, the profits tax base was, to all intents and
purposes, confined to the state and municipal enterprises.  The
tax base was reduced by exemptions to agricultural cooperatives
and to (very few) foreign joint ventures in food processing and
"high-technology" industries.  There were also additional taxes,
levied by off-budgetary means, on profits of successful
enterprises which were used to subsidize loss-making enterprises.
Different tax rates applied to financial enterprises, many of
which were state-owned: commercial banks were taxed at 50
percent, the Bulgarian State Savings Bank at 70 percent, and the
Bulgarian National Bank at 100 percent through quarterly
transfers of profits to the Treasury.
A draft profits tax law proposed replacing this structure in
1994 with a uniform 40 percent rate for all enterprises, state,
municipal, and private.'  Exemptions would also to be
20/  The owner  (the state or municipality) had in addition, in
principle, the right to take an additional 60% of the remaining
profits of an enterprise through an extrabudgetary fund.
21/  Enterprises with up to 49 percent private participation was
30 percent on the first million leva of profits and 40 percent on
profits above this sum.  Enterprises with no more than 49 percent
foreign participation, which had invested in excess of $100,000,
and which are an affiliate of a  foreign corporation, were taxed
at 30 percent.  Where foreign ownership exceeded 49 percent, the
tax rate was hov--er 40 percent.
n  This was to be achieved by elimination of the 10 percent of
profits tax paid by state enterprises to municipalities and
abolition of the 2 percent irrigation tax.15
reduced,3 and a 20% tax was to be imposed on distributed
dividends.  The new simplified structure thus set a uniform rate
for non-financial enterprises.>  For commercial banks, insurance
companies, and the State Savings Bank, there was also to be a
uniform rate, of 50 percent.
These changes left unresolved the problem that the tax base
for profits and turnover taxes continued to consist basically of
the eroding surpluses of the state and municipal enterprise
sector.  The erosion of the state and municipal sector tax base
was moreover greater than indicated by the budgetary statistics.
Figure 1 shows the net contribution to the budget of state
enterprises, when net flows from state enterprises to the budget
are recalculated to include the difference between profits taxes
and non-tax revenues, and subsidies and debt write-offs.  As a
result of reduced subsidies, the state enterprises' budgetary
contribution increased from minus 2 percent of GDP in 1990 to
8.42 percent in 1991, but then fell to around 6 percent of GDP in
1992, as compared to 8% recorded in the budgetary statistics of
Table 1.  State enterprise cross-subsidization further reduced
the revenue contribution of the state enterprise sector to the
23/  Exemptions and concessions were for sheltered workshops,
approved investments to meet environmental objectives, charitable
donations, and dividends received on which taxes have been paid.
There had been a previous proposal to favor private
enterprises, with a 30 percent rate.  This rate would have
applied to domestic enterprises with more than 50 percent foreign
participation, domestic trading enterprises with no state or
municipal participation, and privatized enterprises with more
than 50 percent private equity.16
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government.  The  implication  is that  if profits  and  turnover
taxes  were  to be relied  upon  as a significant  revenue  source,  the
taxes  wouild  have  to levied  on profits  of firms  other  than  in the
state  and municipal  enterprise  sector.
B. Indiract  taxation:  The  turnover  tax  and  VAT
In October  1993,  the  Bulgarian  Parliament  passed  a law
2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
replacing the turnover tax with an 18% VAT.  25The  turnover tax
25/  For a detailed discussion and assessment of the Bulgarian
VAT,  see  Bogetic  and Varga  (1993).17
had been levied at three rates: 26 2% on construction material and
buildings for dwelling purposes; 10% on food, children's goods,
eyeglasses, sanitary and hygienic appliances, rent paid for
residential purposes and passenger transportation; and 22% on all
other goods and services not exempted (28% when measured as a
proportion of the producer price).  The turnover tax was also
levied on imports.  Exemptions from the turnover tax were
extensive,2 and in particular included goods for resale, so in
effect the turnover tax was a tax on sale for final consumption.
26/  The turnover tax had been levied at 43 different rates
before March 1991,
nl/  Exemptions were goods and services not designed for final
consumption; exports; organized travel excursions; international
transport, international communications and international mail
services; goods and services sold within duty-free zones of
airports, ports, border check points and on board ships, aircraft
and trains in international traffic; goods sold to diplomats in
special diplomatic shops; milk, yogurt, ordinary and dietary
bread; protheses, orthopaedic shoes, medical belts, wheel chairs
and other appliances for disabled persons; recycled goods if they
are not harmful; fees collectible by state or municipal
institutions for services rendered to individuals; fees for
transportation of merchandise, goods and passengers by public
transportation; health, educational, teaching and community and
cultural centers; services rendered by children's gardens,
centers for the elderly, boarding houses and other similar
establishments; banking, insurance, reinsurance and other
financial services; sale of postal and revenue stamps; non-
commercial radio and television broadcasting; rental or lease of
land and premises with the exception of services rendered by
hotels, motels, camping sites; revenue from the organization of
congresses, conferences and other scientific deeds of educational
and scientific institutions receiving a subsidy; goods produced
from recycled material; services rendered for environmental
clean-up; and cultural and religious activities.  Blanket
exemptions had also applied to cooperatives (which  were exempt
gene:ally from taxation); in July 1992, the Cooperatives Law was
amended, to make only the cooperatives of handicapped people
exempt from turnover tax; however, these cooperatives were not
exempt from turnover tax on imports.18
The replacement of the turnover tax by a value-added tax had
been deferred a number of times. 2'  Since tha VAT enhances
efficiency ard offers a superior tax base and revenue
potential," 2 the reasons for deferment can be sought in
distributional considerations.  There were fewer exemptions to
the VAT than to the turnover tax,0 and the uniform VAT rate of
18% raised the tax rate for goods and services subject to the
lower turnover tax Pates.  Also, whereas VAT revenues accrued to
the central government, revenue from the turnover tax from sales
by state and municipal enterprises accrued to the state or
municipality, whichever was the owner of the enterprise that paid
the tax; the competing claims of the central and municipal
authorities to revenue thus had a role in the deferral of the
VAT.
Evasion was an important considc_ration. The turnover tax
was easier to evade than the VAT.  Planning procedures under the
socialist regime designated when "sale" was for final
consumption, but in a market economy, "sale for final
28/  There had been a draft law to introduce a VAT as early as
1986.  In 1990, it was envisaged that the VAT Law would be passed
on January 1 1991.  The Law was passed in October 1993.
29/  See Tait  (1988), Gilles, Shoup, and Sicat (1990).
30/  Transfer of ownership of land; leasing of land and
buildings; financial services; insurance services; educational
services, health services; supplies by non-profit organizations
where the supplied item has been donated to the organizations,
and gambling services.  International transport including that of
passengers is classified as an export, which is zero rated.19
consumption" became flexible, permitting sellers to claim that
sale was for further resale.
Evasion was also facilitated by commercial relationships
between state enterprises and private firns.  Under the turnover
tax, goods could be sold by state enterprises to private firms,
with the sale designated as for resale.  The state enterprises
were therefore not obliged to pay the turnover tax, and private
firms being new and outside of tne tax system had a comparative
advantage in evasion of tax obligations.  Incentives for profit
shifting from state to private firms left state enterprises with
low or no value added and private firrs with high value-added;
the VAT thereby potentially subjected private firms to high tax
liability.  State enterprise managers and private entrepreneurs
therefore both had reason to oppose the replacement of the
turnovsr tax by the VAT.31
With the VAT finally introduced, could VAT revenue  be
expected to solve the problem of the transitionary fiscal gap?
some indications are available from a study by Bogetie and  Hassan
(1993),  which estimates a relationship between VAT revenues and
VAT rates in 22 countries that  had single VAT rates  in 1988.  The
estimated relationship predicts VAT revenue for Bulgaria from an
18 percent single rate of approximately 8 percent of GDP.  32
31/  See Hillman and Peters  (1993)  for more extensive discussion.
3V  This estimate is an upper bound.  An important implicit
assumption behind this prediction is that Bulgaria's VAT would
have a base (or the ntuaber  of exemptions) and tax administration
capacity similar to the average country in the sample.  To the
extent that exemptions are more numerous and tax administration20
Projected revenue depends also on projected compliance.  The
structure of the VAT makes evasion difficult relative to other
taxes, because of the reporting to the tax authorities by buyers
entitled to tax refunds.  Potential compliance problems arise at
the stage of sale for final consumption, where the final
purchaser may not report the transaction to the tax authorities
because there is no rebate.  However, the seller for final
consumption cannot unreasonably report purchases for purposes of
rebate without reporting further sales.  Experience from other
countries suggests that extensive compliance with the VAT
develops gradually over time, in line with the administrative
capabilities of the tax authorities and the davelopment of the
appropriate taxpayer ethos (Tait, 1988).
C.  The Personal Income Tax
While the profits and turnover tax bases were eroding, the
personal income tax base was expanding.  The personal income tax
base had two quite different components, wages and salaries of
employees, and incomes from sole-proprietor private businesses.
The maximum marginal rate in 1992 was 40% with five tax brackets.
The maximum rate was increased to 52% in 1993, and the numbaor  of
brackets increased to nine --  to take advantage of tax-base
is weaker than average, VAT revenues are likely to be lower than
predicted by this model.21
expansion.  There  were  exemptions  for agricultural
cooperatives,  "young  families" 3 > with income  from  agriculture,
income  for social  service  payments,  and income  from  production  of
consumer  goods (25%  exemption).
Relations  between  state  and local  government  also  affected
the  personal  income  tax.  The sharing  arrangement  for  revenues
from  the tax  was subject  to negotiation." Since  revenue  from
the personal  income  tax  was becoming  increasingly  prominent,  this
tax base  became  subject  to competition  between  central  and local
governments.
As with  the  profits  and indirect  taxes,  tax evasion  issues
are again  central. Incentives  for  cooperation  between  employer
and  employee  to evade  the personal  tax increase  with the
difference  between  net  wages  received  by employees  and the gross
cost  of labor  to the employer. At a normalized  gross  wage of
100,  from  the  perspective  of the employer,  the addition  of social
security  contributions  (42  percent  average  in Bulgaria)  and
contributions to the unemployment and retraining fund
contribution (7  percent) increase the gross cost of labor to 149.
If a health fund payment  is added, the emplcyer's cost of labor
increases to more than 160.  From the employee's perspective, an
33/  A proposal for 1994 was a simplified structure with three
marginal rates of 15 percent, 30 percent, and 40 pe:  :ent.
34/  Defined as where one partner was less than 35 yedrs old at
the time of marriage.
35/  In 1992, the revenue from the tax was for example divided 70
percent to the municipality and 30 percent to the central
government.22
average tax rate of 12 percent yields a  net wage of 88, as
compared to a gross cost of labor of 160.  At the raximum
marginal tax rate, the difference is more than the gross wage.
Such magnitudes leave considerable scope for bargaining between
employer and employee regarding the sharing of gains from an
employment relation outside the tax system.  The illegality of
such an informal employment relation also creates incentives for
the employer to limit employment to family members and close
trusted friends.
While in principle, the personal income tax was levied on
incomes of self-employed individuals as well as employees, in
practice the tax administration could not monitor the large
number of small businesses, so enhancing evasion opportunities in
the private sector, both for employees and the self-employed.
However, in distinction to the profits tax and the turnover tax,
the employer had an incentive to report the personal income tax
obligations  (and  make the payment via withholding) of his
employees.  As we have observed, the personal income tax base
was not subject to the tax-base erosion of the profits and
turnover taxes.23
6. TAX EVASION
Tax evasion is a recurring theme in the above consideration
of taxation in the transition.'  Under the tax system described
above, opportunities for tax evasion are not uniform.  The
temptation is nonetheless to tax those who can be taxed.  Wage
and salary earners subjoct to withholding then boar the brunt of
tax increases, while the self-employed who can conduct unreported
cash transactions contribute less thar a  proportionate (or
"fair") share  of  revenue.  The tax system is in particular not
horizontally equitable, insofar as employees and employers in the
private sector have better opportunities for  the evasion than
those in the state and municipal enterprises.  In a  competitive
labor market, wage differentials would capitalize the different
effective .ax rates, eliminating horizontal inequity.  However,
in the transition, labor markets tend not to be competitive; as
we  have noted, employers in the private sector prefer to hire
family and close personal friends, for reasons of trust, to
facilitate tax evasion.  With employment conditions described by
insider/outsider relationships, income discrepancies associated
with "good" jobs in the private sector and "bad" jobs in the
state sector can therefore persist --  where "good" and "bad"
reflect tax evasion possibilities.  The perceived inequalities
can provide a justification of increased sfforts at non-
compliance.
M  Evasion has been extensively  studied.  See Cowell  (1990)  and
Tanzi  (1993b).24
It has been proposed that in the conditions of the
transition, the effectively low tax rates in the private sector
due to widespread evasion should be left as such, because of
incentives for private sector development  (for example, McKinnon,
1991).  Yet whatever sympathy one may have with this position,
because of expenditure reeds of the transition and the erosion of
traditional tax bases, the question may be not whether, but how
to tax the private sector, and how to do so without unduly
adversely affecting incentives for private sector development?
7. A TAX SYSTI44 FOR THE TRANSITION?
The BuJ.,aiian  tax system introduced in the transition
resembles tn.;.^  of western market economies, with regard to rates
of taxation arid  types of taxes.  However, neither the tax bases
of the western -. arket  economy nor western standards of tax
monitoring and  :..vpliance  are present in the transition. 3 7
Recommendations t,r deterring tax evasion and increasing revenue
collection can bo readily proposed.  A list would include: (i)
improved tax adminiistration,  to increase coverage of the tax
system and to increase the probability of detection of evasion;
(ii) increased penalties to increase the cost of detection, and
(i1ii reduced tax rates to decrease the benefit of evasion.  Each
of these policies decreases the expected benefit of tax evasion.
3X/  See also for comparison Shome and Escolano (1993),  who
review tax policies in tiPe  central Asian and transcaucasian
states of the former Soviet Union, and find the tax systems
inappropriate, but for reasons of inconsistency with long-run
afficiency and equity, and short-term budgetary stability.25
The policies hiave  however different time dimensions of
implementation.  Improving the tax administration is a more
prolonged task than changing the structure and rates of taxes and
penalties. 3'  In the short term, because of limited
administrative resources, it may be possible to detect and
discipline only a  small number of marny  evaders.  The
administration will tend to focus on Aarge tax payers, hence
leaving smaller potential taxpayers to confront lower risks of
detection.  There are also limitations on penalties for evasion,
in particular in the new post-communist democratic environment.
Given the administrative constraints and the propensities
for tax evasion, what form should the tax structure take? 39
Beyond adherence to general principles of tax design,40  is
replication of the tax structure of developed market economies
appropriate for the transition?  The conditions of the transition
suggest that in choosing a tax rate structure, regard be taken of
a  transition-Laffer curve that encompasses both supply incentives
and tax evasion.  That is, it is possible that lower marginal tax
rates combined with publicized penalties may increase revenue.
39/  See Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher (1992).
391  An answer to this question could be sought in models that
specify revenue-maximizing tax and penalty structures in the
presence of opportunities for evasion and probabilities of
detection; see for example Polinsky and Shavell (1991) and
Bebchuk and Kaplow  (1993).  In practice, the theoretical results
are not readily translatable into concretely defensible, detailed
specifications of tax and penalty rates, because of information
required on individuals' factor supply elasticities and levels of
risk aversion.
CY  See Shalizi et al. (1991),  the World Bank (1993).26
This possibility is of importance given the tendency to increase
tax rates in attempts to increase revenue.4 1
In theory, a lowering of tax rates should ceteris paribus
reduce tax evasion, since the expected benefit of evasion is
reduced.  However, potential taxpayers outside of the tax system
may choose to remain so even at the lower tax rates, while
revenues  from those taxpayers who are "visible" and subject to
the tax authorities' scrutiny decline because of the lower rates.
On the other hand, rampant tax evasion reduces the scope for
revenue loss from preexisting taxpayers, and individuals
previously not paying taxes may be led by the reduced rates to
comply with their tax obligations.  It is therefore an empirical
matter whether revenues rise or fall in consequence of reduced
tax rates --  which of course underlies the Laffer curve.
Although data to calculate tax-revenue elasticities with
respect to tax rates is not available, there is nonetheless a
basis for a case that in the circumstances of the transition, a
lowering of marginal tax rates from the neighborhood of 50
percent, or 40 percent, to modest maximum rates of 20-25%, would
increase rather than decrease revenue.  With the limitations in
the tax administration's eaforc=aent of private-sector tax
compliance, the case rests on changing behavioral norms.  Tax
evasion is subject to a demonstration effect.  Some part of the
"1/  Buchanan and Lee (1982)  note that governments may increase
tax rates even when the Laffer curve dictates that revenue will
as a  consequence fall, because the fall in revenue will be
realized in the long run, whereas increased revenue will be
provided in the short run.27
population may regard it as a  civic duty to pay taxes,' 2 but if
many individuals in the taxpayer's reference group are evading
taxes, then sentiments of civic responsibility may become
unsustainable.  The ease of evasion has a further indirect effect
on voluntary compliance: where there is no explicit communication
among prospective taxpayers, each individual's perception of his
opportunities for evasion nonetheless leads to the inference that
similar opportunities confront other individuals, who following
their individual self-interest evade tax payments; and
individuals perceiving this may well do likewise.  Particularly
in an economy in transition, where civic sentiments are initially
not pervasive and there is a distrust of government because of
past experiences under socialism, such demonstration effects and
matching behavior reinforce natural incentives for evasion.' 3
With the prior socialist economic system as the frame of
reference, individuals view high tax rates as arbitrary and
unjust, and as confirmatory evidence that government continues to
be rapacious.  Low tax rates provide a counter to the lack of
trust and the perception of "exploitation" by giving the
impression of a  more modest government.
This is then the case for a  moderate and modest tax regime
in the transition.  High taxes are evaded.  Lower taxes may also
be evaded, but with a lower likelihood; and if the social stigma
42  See Harberger  (1993)  on the moral dimension of taxation.
43/  For a formalization of this type of strategic matching
behavior, see Joel Guttman (1987);  for experimental evidence, see
Guttman (1986)28
of being subject to publicized penalties is a deterrent to
evasion, this stigma is greater and the moral basis for evasion
is diminished when it is moderate taxes that are evaded.
A modest tax structure is not in itself sufficient to expand
the private-sector tax base.  An associated impediment is
individuals' percoption of the time inconsistency of announced
tax policies.  That is, individuals  may perceive a modest tax
structure as a short-run strategy by the government to entice
them into participation in the tax system.  This is reinforced if
as in the case of Bulgaria tax rates are routinely changed.  A
constitutional limitation on future tax increases provides the
assurance of a maintained modest tax structure."
8.  TAX BASE ADEQUACY AND CONDITIONALITY
We conclude with observations on the relation between tax
base adequacy in the transition and conditionality for
international-agency assistance.  It is the supportive role of
international institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund to provide external financing that
assists governments to manage balance of payments and budgetary
expenditure pressures of the transition.  The conditionality of
policy-based lending typically requires compliance with a pre-
agreed government budgetary program that specifies an upper limit
to the government's budget deficit relative to GDP (on the case
4V  On the case for constitutional limitations that bound
political discretion, see Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and
Buchanan (1993).29
Table 2:  DifferentIl.  Between Projected and  Actual Government Revenue  for 2992
Percen Differenial from the Proieclioa
Ql,  1992  Q2, 1992  Q3, 1992  Q4, 1992
TOrAL REVENUE  +  1.3  -9.9  -15.1  -1.0
TAX REVENUE  + 6.0  -2.9  .10.5  -7.0
Profita  lax.  -20.0  +  7.2  -50.5  -37.0
Nonfinsacia  -31.6  -24.3  .38.3  -42.0
Financial  + 3.7  +61.2  .69.1  -30.0
Tumover  ax  +16.0  -12.2  -4.2  -5.0
Incomeux  +60.6  +71.0  +102.0  +180.0
Customs  duties  +64.3  + 16.5  +30.7  +32.0
Excise  taxes  -74.3  -55.9  46.3  -. 0
Social  scurity  - - 6.1  + 7.7
NON-TAX  RVENUFJ  +136 6  +36.6  + 1034  4-2  0
Sourc:  Minity  of Finance  and  IMF.
of Bulgaria, see the World Bank, 1993).  The conditionality
specifies macroeconomic targets and fiscal performance
objectives, and is also a discipline on government, either
directly, or by providing a force-majeure response to claimants
for government transfers and subsidies.  For the tax-base related
reasons that we have set out, compliance with the budgetary
conditionality requirements has in practice been difficult.  If
(or  when) a program breaks down because of failure of compliance,
the tax-base problems are exacerbated, since the government is
also left without the foreign financing which is withdrawn as the
penalty for non-compliance.
Table 2 compares budget projections and realized tax
revenues in the four quarters of 1992.  The differences are a
reflection of the extent of uncertainty, or indeed, optimism in30
revenue collection from the traditional primary tax bases.
Revenues from profits taxes were below budgetary predictions
(with the exception of the second quarter), as was turnover tax
revenue.  Revenue from the personal income tax was however
significantly above budgetary projections.  In the second and
third quarters, aggregate revenue was respectively 10% and 15%
below budgetary projections.  In the fourth quarter, due mainly
to the compounding increase in revenue from the personal income
tax and customs duties, the differentia'l  between projected and
realized revenue was reduced to 1%.
Since overly optimistic projections of government revenue
are in themselves a reason for potential non-compliance with
conditionality of assistance programs, accuracy in the
computation of the revenue capacity of tax bases is important.
Inadequate tax bases in the transition are a problem, but non-
existent tax bases that were presumed in advance to be available
compound budgetary problems when the projections form the basis
for budget deficit conditionality targets.  This then complements
our conclusions regarding the tax regime.  Not only should the
tax regime be modest, but there should likewise be modesty in
projections of what is feasible with regard to tax bases in the
transition.31
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